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We model competition between two unregulated mobile phone companies with
price{elastic demand and less than full market coverage. We also assume that there
is a regulated full{coverage ¯xed network. In order to induce stronger competition,
mobile companies could have an incentive to raise their reciprocal mobile{to{mobile
access charges above the marginal costs of termination. Stronger competition leads to
an increase of the mobiles' market shares, with the advantage that (genuine) network
e®ects are strengthened. Therefore, `collusion' may well be in line with social welfare.
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11 Introduction
The regulation of termination charges on the ¯xed network is widely considered to be a
cornerstone for the promotion of competition in liberalized telecommunication markets. In
Germany, as in Europe in general, the desire to foster competition led to an asymmetric
treatment of the dominating ¯xed network provider (Deutsche Telekom AG which owns and
controls more than ninety percent of the local loop) on the one hand and the mobile phone
providers (two larger and two smaller ¯rms, with Deutsche Telekom being the largest) on
the other hand. Under the German regime only the ¯xed network's termination charges are
regulated, not those of the mobile networks. Moreover, the retail prices of mobile compa-
nies are also unregulated whereas those of the ¯xed network are subjected to a price cap.
The ¯xed network provider is, however, allowed to pass the ¯xed{to{mobile termination
charges on to its consumers. That is, the price of a call originating on the ¯xed network and
terminating on a mobile network equals the (regulated) ¯xed network retail price plus the
(unregulated) termination charge set by the respective mobile company.
This paper investigates the economic consequences of such an asymmetric regulation on the
remaining, unregulated access prices and tari®s. We will analyze competition between two
independent mobile phone companies under the assumption that total demand for mobile
connections is price elastic, i.e., that the market is only partially covered by mobile providers.
This assumption is in contrast to the standard model of competition between networks, see
for example La®ont, Rey, and Tirole (1998, section 5), Gans and King (2001). We will
additionally assume that every customer also connects on to the single, regulated ¯xed
network provider. As the coexistence of ¯xed and mobile phones opens up the possibility
to call a person in di®erent ways (from ¯xed to ¯xed, from ¯xed to mobile, from mobile to
¯xed, and from mobile to mobile), we will assume that di®erent kinds of calls are imperfect
substitutes.
We allow for two{part tari®s with price di®erentiation for on{net and o®{net calls. Mobile
companies will set the variable prices for di®erent kinds of calls by taking into account
the substitutabilities between the di®erent kinds of calls as well as the perceived marginal
costs, which may include termination charges. The ¯xed components of the tari®s, i.e., the
connection prices, are used to compete for customers and, of course, to extract rents.
It turns out that mobile companies set their termination charges for calls originating from
the ¯xed network above the marginal interconnection costs. The negotiated (reciprocal)
2termination charge for mobile{to{mobile calls is used as a strategic instrument to either
soften or strengthen competition for customers. In the latter case, a termination charge above
marginal costs leads to tari®{induced network e®ects which induce tougher competition
for customers. As a consequence, the number of mobile phone users and hence the ¯rms'
market shares increase. This is desirable for the companies for two reasons. First, since
mobile connections generate a genuine positive network externality (by an improvement of
reachability) mobiles become the more attractive the more consumers already have a mobile.
Second, the more customers are connected to a mobile network the higher the number of
calls either originating from or terminating on the mobile networks. Both e®ects raise the
pro¯ts of mobile companies, so that mobile companies have, in principle, an incentive to use
high termination charges as a commitment device for strong competition. Note that this
is also perfectly in line with social welfare maximization. The networks e®ects imply that
`collusion' for stronger competition increases social welfare.
The extent to which mobile companies will strengthen competition by choosing a high
termination charge for mobile{to{mobile calls depends in a complex way on the degree of
substitutability (which we assume to be the same between all di®erent kinds of calls) and the
implied market shares. Our model shows that if there were no substitutes at all, i.e. all kinds
of calls are independent goods (a very unrealistic case), the additional utility from using a
mobile is rather high which in turn leads to relatively high market shares. The marginal
importance of market coverage is then rather small, which also implies that the mobile
companies will try to soften competition by setting the termination charge below marginal
cost. At the other extreme, if di®erent kinds of calls were perfect substitutes, there would
be no room for mobiles in the ¯rst place (given that their costs are no less than those of the
cost{price regulated ¯xed network). However, for an intermediate degree of substitutability
we obtain the above mentioned result, namely, that the negotiated termination charge is set
above marginal costs of termination. The degree of substitutability is therefore an important
variable, as it a®ects the relative strength of the di®erent e®ects and the viability of mobiles
in the ¯rst place.
The model yields a structure of access and retail prices that seems to be in line with casual
empiricism. Mobile{to{mobile termination charges being above marginal costs of termina-
tion resemble observed pricing behavior of ¯rms. Moreover, when this relationship holds
it turns out that the ¯xed{to{mobile termination charges will exceed both the regulated
mobile{to{¯xed and the mobile{to{mobile charges. The implied retail prices for ¯xed{to{
3mobile calls exceed those for on{net mobile calls. Furthermore, o®{net mobile{to{mobile
calls are more expensive than those on{net.
This structure of access and retail prices is in contrast to the results obtained in the standard
model with full market coverage, see Gans and King (2001, Proposition 2), Cambini and
Valletti (2003) and De Bijl and Peitz (2002, section 6.4). Full market coverage implies that
reciprocal access charges are set below marginal costs, which leads to other implausible price
relationships, namely, prices for o®{net mobile{to{mobile calls being lower than those for
on{net mobile calls. While Schi® (2002) considers partial market coverage, he also assumes
that the ¯rms' tari®s a®ect the consumers' ex ante participation decisions which leads to
¯ercer competition for customers. Neglecting price discrimination between o®{net and on{
net calls and concentrating on two networks, Schi® shows that access charges below marginal
cost are again optimal.
Optimal access charges above marginal costs are obtained by Poletti and Wright (2004)
and Valletti and Cambini (2005). Focusing on di®erent consumer groups Poletti and Wright
(2004) show that access charges above marginal costs can increase the ¯rms' pro¯ts by
increasing the marginal tari®s for light users and thus relaxing the incentive constraints
for heavy users. Valletti and Cambini (2005) analyze quality improving investments. Since
access charges above marginal costs impose an access de¯cit on a network with a larger
market share, the ¯rms' incentives to attract more customers by enhancing the quality of
their networks are negatively correlated with the access charges. Thus, access charges above
marginal costs serve as a mechanism to reduce costly investments in quality.
We know of no model that addresses the issue of mobile{to{mobile access charges in a
situation with only partial market coverage by mobiles and an alternative ¯xed network
in the background. The existing literature on mobile phone telecommunication focuses on
¯xed{to{mobile access charges. To that aim, Houpis and Valletti (2004) assume that there
are no mobile{to{mobile calls. Gans and King (2000) use the same assumption in one
part of their paper; in the other part they assume that mobile{to{mobile access charges are
exogenously set at the marginal costs of termination. These papers ¯nd that ¯xed{to{mobile
access charges are set too high (from a welfare point of view) and thus should be regulated,
as is the case in the UK and Australia. In our model, mobile companies will also set the
¯xed{to{mobile access charges above marginal costs of termination. However, here we take
the German regulatory regime as given and focus on its implications on mobile{to{mobile
access charges.
4The next section introduces the model. Section 3 analyzes demand. The equilibrium deter-
mination of market shares is quite complex and allows for no closed solution of the demand
expressions, even if a simple underlying utility function is used. We therefore have to resort
to a numerical example for the ¯nal analysis of price competition and negotiated access
charges in section 4. Section 5 discusses variations in the degree of substitutability between
di®erent kinds of calls. Section 6 summarizes.
2 The Model
2.1 Firms
We consider competition between three di®erent telecommunication ¯rms, A, B, and F.
Firm F is the single (incumbent) ¯xed network provider, while ¯rms A and B are two
mobile phone companies. We have to keep track where telephone calls originate and where
they terminate. For i;j 2 fA;B;Fg, we denote by Xi
j the number of calls originating at





























Figure 1: Inter- and Intranetwork calls
A ¯rm faces three cost components. First, there is a ¯xed cost ki per customer subscribing
to its network, where we assume kA = kB ¸ kF, since mobiles usually incur higher costs.
Next, there are variable costs per call originating or terminating on a ¯rm's network. For the
¯xed network, F, the variable costs are normalized to zero. Again, in order to capture the
5commonly observed cost di®erential of mobile networks, we allow for variable costs c ¸ 0 of
¯rms A and B. Note that operating an on{net call within a mobile network costs 2c. The
third cost component are the access charges for interconnecting calls. For i 6= j, we denote
by ai
j the termination charge ¯rm i has to pay to ¯rm j for a call originating at network i
and terminating at network j.
Firms' proceeds consist of the termination charges they receive from other ¯rms and the
tari®s paid by their own customers. We will consider tari®s consisting of a subscription fee
and prices per calls. The ¯xum charged by ¯rm i to each subscriber is denoted by si. The
price charged by ¯rm i to a customer who calls someone at network j from its network is
denoted by pi
j (including the case i = j).
We assume that the total mass of consumers is 1 and that all consumers connect to the
¯xed network. A consumer may in addition connect to either one of the two mobile networks
(it is assumed that no{one wants to carry around two mobiles). Letting nA resp. nB denote


























































































Asymmetric regulation is captured by the following assumptions. As termination charges
of the ¯xed network are regulated, we assume that aA
F = aB
F = 0, since ¯rm F's variable
costs are zero. In contrast, termination charges of mobile networks are not regulated. We
assume that mobile companies enter bargaining over a reciprocal bilateral access charge
a := aA
B = aB
A. Afterwards each mobile company unilaterally sets the termination charge
that has to be paid by the ¯xed network, aF
A resp. aF
B, as well as its own tari®; these are
unregulated. In contrast, tari®s of the ¯xed network are regulated. We assume that they
just cover costs, so that sF = kF, pF
F = 0 and pF
i = aF
i for i = A;B, since the ¯xed network
provider is allowed to pass termination charges of mobile companies on to consumers.1 Note
1Recall that variable costs of the ¯xed network are assumed to be zero. If they were positive, say cF > 0,
then aA
F = aB
F = cF, pF
F = 2cF, and pF
i = cF + aF
i .
6that the ¯xed network provider is not an active player in this game.
We are now able to summarize the timing of the model.
1. Mobile companies bargain over their reciprocal access charge a.
2. Mobile companies simultaneously choose ¯xed network access charges, aF
A resp. aF
B,
and their own tari®s, si and pi
j for i = A;B and j = A;B;F.
3. Consumers subscribe to the ¯xed network and decide about subscription to a mobile
company.
4. Consumers decide about the amounts of calls they want to make.
In order to solve the model by backward induction we have to describe consumer choice.
2.2 Consumers
Consumers are ex ante di®erentiated with respect to their valuation of having a mobile,
as well as to their preferences among the two mobiles. After the connecting decisions have
been made, they are additionally di®erentiated according to their `subscriber types'. These
are denoted by i 2 fA;B;Fg as follows: If a consumer subscribes to a mobile company
(and the ¯xed network) he becomes an `A{subscriber' resp. `B{subscriber'; if he does not
subscribe to any mobile, but only to the ¯xed network, he becomes an `F{subscriber'.
Letting CSi denote the surplus an i{subscriber derives from calls (to be described below)
and introducing two consumer{type variables µ and ¹ (to be explained immediately) we
arrive at the following total utility expression.




CSA ¡ sA ¡ sF + µ ¡ ¹ if he subscribes to A
CSB ¡ sB ¡ sF + µ ¡ (1 ¡ ¹) if he subscribes to B
CSF ¡ sF if he does not subscribe
The consumer types µ and ¹ introduce vertical as well as horizontal product di®erentiation
from an ex ante point of view. The larger a consumer's µ the more he desires a mobile. On
the other hand, the larger his ¹ the more he is enticed by the image and design of mobile
company B, as compared to A; while consumer ¹ = 1=2 is intrinsically indi®erent between
7the two. We assume that consumer preferences are such that µ 2 [0;1] and ¹ 2 [0;1] are
uniformly and independently distributed.
Calls enter utility as follows. We assume that only outgoing calls are valued (i.e. the calls
someone makes, not the ones he receives). We also assume a uniform calling behavior, i.e.
an i{subscriber makes to every j{subscriber the same amounts of calls. However, there are
di®erent kinds of calls to the same person. We assume that using a mobile or a conventional
telephone are imperfect substitutes. For example, the conventional phone o®ers a higher
quality of connection and is more convenient to use, if it is in easy reach. But if one is
away from it, a mobile is more convenient. Similarly, if one wants to call someone who is
at home or in his o±ce one will call him on his ¯xed telephone. But if he is likely to be
somewhere else, one might try to call him on the mobile ¯rst (if he has one). Thus, there
are potentially four di®erent modes of calling the same person. In order to express agents'
utilities, we introduce the following notation. The kind of phone used will be indicated by
either f, ¯xed, or m, mobile. Then, for i;j 2 fA;B;Fg and k;l 2 ff;mg, denote
xik
jl : The amount of calls by an i{subscriber using his k{kind of phone
to each j{subscriber on his l{kind of phone.
Note, superscripts describe origination (Who calls, using which kind of phone?) and sub-
scripts termination (Who is being called, which kind of phone is ringing?). Examples are:
xAm
Bf : The amount of calls by an A{subscriber using his mobile
to each B{subscriber on his ¯xed phone.
x
Ff
Bm : The amount of calls by a non{subscriber (using his ¯xed phone, of course)
to each B{subscriber on his mobile.
Clearly, xFk
jl = 0 if k 6= f and xik
Fl = 0 if l 6= f, since non{subscribers have no mobiles. All
other xik
jl can be positive and in the following we will presume that they are.
Since xik
jl are de¯ned as numbers of calls to each j{subscriber it follows that, for example, an
A{subscriber will make a total of nBxAm
Bm mobile{to{mobile calls to all the B{subscribers.
An A{subscriber's utility from calling B{subscribers in the four di®erent modes is assumed











8where U(¢) is a standard concave utility function with imperfect substitutes. Denoting the
number of non{subscribers by nF := 1¡nA¡nB, a non{subscriber's utility from calling other








































Note, implicit in this formulation is a positive externality from an increase of nA or nB (at
the expense of nF) on every consumer. The reason is that only non{subscribers are subject
to the constraints xFk
jl = 0 if k 6= f and xik
Fl = 0 if l 6= f, while everyone can be called on the
¯xed network. Hence, if all the other xik
jl are strictly positive at the consumption optimum,
the maximized terms in the square brackets of (4) must be higher for j = A and j = B
than for j = F.




































where ° 2 [0;1) measures the degree of substitutability of the goods, assumed to be identical
for all kinds of calls.
Before analyzing the model, we will state the relations between individual and aggregate
amounts of calls. Recall that an A{subscriber makes a total of nBxAm
Bm mobile{to{mobile calls
to the B{subscribers. This implies that the total number of calls originating at network A
and terminating at network B equals XA
B = nAnBxAm
Bm. Similarly, we arrive at the following
relationships between the di®erent patterns of use (xik
jl) and the total amount of connections
(Xi



















































































3.1 Demand for calls
At the ¯nal stage 4 of the game, i{subscribers, for i 2 fA;B;Fg, will decide about the











if i = F and k 6= f
or j = F and l 6= f
In the following we denote the vector of variable prices by p = (pi
j), for all i;j 2 fA;B;Fg,
the vector of market shares by n = (nA;nB;nF), and the solutions to the above program by
xik
jl(p;n). For the Dixit utility function given in (5) the Appendix shows that these functions
are linear in prices, decreasing in the respective own prices (i.e., the direct costs as given
in (4)) and increasing in the other prices. Inserting the solution back into CSi gives, as a
preliminary result, the maximized consumer surplus for given market shares. These values
will be denoted by vi(p;n) and their vector by v(p;n) = (vA(p;n);vB(p;n);vF(p;n)).
3.2 Connection decisions
At stage 3 consumers make the subscription decisions. Assuming that all subscriber groups
are strictly positive, we can identify the respective indi®erent consumers. In the following
we omit the arguments of functions where this does not lead to confusion. Among the




A ¡ ¹ + µ = v
B ¡ s









where s := (sA;sB). Hence, consumers with ¹ > ¹¤ will subscribe to company B, if at
all. The consumers who are indi®erent between non{subscription to a mobile (i.e. `F{
subscription') and subscription to mobile company A resp. B are given by the conditions
v
F = vA ¡ s














B + (1 ¡ ¹)
10Hence, consumers with ¹ < ¹¤ and µ > µA will subscribe to mobile company A and to F.
Consumers with ¹ > ¹¤ and µ > µB will subscribe to mobile company B and to F. The
remainder will only subscribe to F.
We can now calculate the equilibrium amounts of subscribers. De¯ning ¹A(v(p;n);s) :=














and nF = 1 ¡ nA ¡ nB. After inserting ¹¤ and vi(p;n), the system of equations can be
solved for (nA;nB;nF). Note that this solution gives us the market shares as well as the
consumer surpluses as functions of the tari®s (p;s) only, i.e. a vector n(p;s) and a vector
v(p;s) := v(p;n(p;s)). Figure 2 illustrates a possible market segmentation that could be
the result of ¯rms' pricing decisions (in the example shown it holds that ¹A = ¹B = ¹¤ and
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Figure 2: Possible market segmentation
Finally, total demands for connections, Xi
j, which enter the ¯rms' pro¯t functions, can be
calculated using (6) to (9). Note that the demand expressions are highly non{linear in
prices even if they are based on a Dixit utility function. Although the individual choices of
calls, xik
jl(p;n), are simple linear functions in the variable prices, the equilibrium pattern of
market segmentation yields complicated expressions for the ni(p;s), which will then have
11to be multiplied to get the Xi
j. However, the Dixit utility function yields unique demand
expressions with interior solutions for appropriate price ranges and with comparative statics
having the expected signs.
4 Choices of mobile phone companies
4.1 Tari®s and ¯xed{to{mobile access charges
At stage 2, mobile companies individually and simultaneously set the ¯xed{to{mobile access
charges as well as their own tari®s (taking their reciprocal access charge a as given). That is,
¯rm i = A;B sets aF
i , si and pi
j for j = A;B;F. Recalling regulation of the ¯xed network,
sF = kF, pF
F = 0; ai
F = 0 and pF
i = aF
i (since the ¯xed network is allowed to pass access
charges for o®{net calls on to consumers), we now look at reaction functions and Nash
equilibrium for stage 2.
De¯ning ci
i := 2c and ci
j := c + ai
j for j 6= i the pro¯t expression of mobile phone company






















For ¯rm B analogously. In order to characterize reaction functions by ¯rst{order conditions,
we have to take account of the fact that consumers' connection decision equilibrium (nA;nB)
depends on the tari®s, si and pi
j for i;j = A;B;F.






























A = 0 (12)























Turning to the variable price components, the ¯rst{order conditions for pA
h, for h = A;B;F,



































A) = 0 (13)

















































h the e®ects of price changes on demand °ows,
holding market segmentation constant.2 The ¯rst{order condition (13) can be simpli¯ed




h is total demand for A{h{connections, an A{subscriber's individual demand
is XA
h =nA). Second, one checks that conditions (10) and (11) imply @ni/@vj = ¡ @ni/@sj




















Inserting these expressions, substituting XA
h by Roy's identity, and using (12), the ¯rst{order
conditions (13) for the variable prices pA




























Thus, in the initial ¯rst{order condition (13), the marginal e®ects of prices on market
segmentation cancel out with the direct price e®ects, if the ¯rst{order condition for sA is
satis¯ed. This is also intuitive, and a standard property. Firms use the ¯xed price component
to attract subscribers, and the variable price components to a®ect calling behavior in the
most pro¯table way.
Finally, turn to the ¯rst{order condition for the ¯xed{to{mobile access charge, aF
A = pF
A.
For this price, a similar simpli¯cation as for the other variable prices is not possible (since
mobile companies do not control the respective ¯xed price component, sF). We therefore



































A) = 0 (15)



























































over all i;g 2 fA;B;Fg and all k;l 2
ff;mg.
13Reaction functions of ¯rm B are given analogously.
While it is impossible to ¯nd a closed form solution for all relevant reaction functions,
using the Dixit utility function allows us to solve (14) for the equilibrium prices pA
h (see the
Appendix). To solve (12) and (15) together with the equations determining nA and nB (see
(10) and (11)) we have to rely on numerical speci¯cations. Focusing on symmetric Nash
equilibria, i.e., equilibria with sA = sB, pA
F = pB
F, and employing the Dixit function reveals
that there exists a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium. Using c = 0, kA = kB = 0:2 and
° = 0:5 we get the equilibrium prices and the ¯rms' market shares nA = nB as functions of
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Figure 3: Prices and market shares as functions of a
While the price for on{net mobile calls, pA
A, is almost una®ected by a (slightly increasing),
the price for o®{net mobile calls, pA
B, is markedly increasing, so as to pass the increased access
charge a on to consumers. However, the ¯xed subsription price sA is decreasing in a, since
¯rms have an incentive to attract more customers to their own network if interconnection
gets more costly (tari®{induced network e®ects). The combined e®ect of these tari® changes
on the joint market shares of mobile phone companies, 2nA, is positive. That is, the positive
e®ect of the decrease in sA basically outweighs the negative e®ect of the increase in pA
B.
3Note that kF has no e®ect on model results.
144.2 Mobile{to{mobile access charges
Turning to the ¯rst stage of the game, i.e., the determination of the termination charge
a, we assume that a is determined in bilateral bargaining between the mobile companies.
Again, focusing on symmetric equilibria, a will be chosen such that the mobile companies'
pro¯ts are maximized.
Inspection of Figure 3 clearly indicates that the mobil ¯rms have to balance two main
e®ects when they decide on a. While there is negative correlation between a and the
consumers' subscription price, sA, the correlation between a and the ¯rms' market shares
nA is positive. Taking into account that higher market shares have a positive network
e®ect on all consumers, and particularly on the mobile phone subscribers (genuine network
e®ects), it might be attractive for the mobile companies to raise a above the marginal costs
of termination. Employing numerical values c = 0, kA = kB = 0:2 and ° = 0:5, the left
graph in Figure 4 shows that, indeed, pro¯ts achieve their maximum at a positive bilateral
termination charge a (which is the solution to stage 1 of the game), although marginal
costs are c = 0 in this example.
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0 . 0 7 6 3 4
0 . 0 7 6 3 6
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Figure 4: Pro¯ts and welfare in a
This result contrasts a standard result in the literature on ¯xed network competition, e.g.
Gans and King (2001), Cambini and Valletti (2003), and De Bijl and Peitz (2002, section
6.4). In these models the two ¯rms would agree to set the reciprocal access charge even
below the marginal cost of termination (in our notation a < c = 0 if possible), in order to
soften ensuing competition and induce higher subscription prices. In our model, with less
than full market coverage by mobile companies, there is an incentive to raise a in order to
increase market shares and realize network e®ects.
From the point of view of antitrust one might call an access charge a > c `too high' and
15an incident of `collusion'. Of course, in a technical sense there is collusion, since ¯rms set
a cooperatively. However, while conventional wisdom does anticipate that ¯rms want to
induce an ensuing equilibrium with higher variable prices (here pA
B and pB
A), it seems to
overlook that ¯rms also want to induce lower subscription prices (sA and sB). We might,
in fact, interpret `collusion' as a commitment to more aggressive competitive behavior, in
order to enhance market coverage, which is quite in contrast to the conventional antitrust
view.
To make the point more explicit we also calculated social welfare (consumers' willingness' to
pay minus their payments, plus ¯rms' pro¯ts). The right graph in Figure 5 shows that the
socially optimal level of a is positive as well, and it is closer to the pro¯t maximizing level of
a than to c = 0. Thus, even an agent in charge of welfare maximization would raise a above
marginal costs in order to induce more intense competition among the mobile companies
which leads to increased positive (genuine) network e®ects.
Furthermore, comparing Figures 3 and 4, our example leads to realistic price relationships.
With a¤ = 0:065 as the optimal termination charge (see Figure 4), the retail prices sat-
isfy pA
B > pA
A (see Figure 3a), that is, on{net mobile calls are cheaper than o®{net calls.4
Moreover, our example exhibits pF
A > pA
A > pA
F, which seems to be realistic as well. Finally,
mobiles' subscription prices are sA = 0:49, above the cost of connection (kA = 0:2) but
not as extraordinarily high as would be predicted by the standard model of ¯xed network
competition. The relationship of access charges, pA
F = aF
A > a > aA
F = 0, also corresponds
to reality, while the standard model with full market coverage would predict a < aA
F.
5 Comparative statics in the degree of substitutability
Table 1 shows the dependence of results on the degree of substitutability, °, for selected val-
ues. All prices and the market share are calculated for the corresponding optimal negotiated
access charge a¤.
4The exact numbers are given in Table 1 below, row ° = 0:5.





0:05 ¡0:03 0:621 0:001 0:021 ¡0:029 0:448 0:44 0:1
0:25 0:048 0:501 0:02 0:058 0:051 0:33 0:293 0:075
0:5 0:065 0:49 0:016 0:059 0:069 0:209 0:209 0:04
0:75 0:04 0:48 0:009 0:036 0:043 0:109 0:167 0:015
0:95 0:01 0:473 0:002 0:008 0:011 0:022 0:144 0:005
Table 1: Impact of ° on the optimal access charges and equilibrium prices
The negotiated termination charge a¤ is not monotone in °, illustrating the complicated
interactions in this model. For ° = 0:05 we get the `traditional' result that ¯rms set
the termination charge below marginal costs and that the market shares of mobiles are
relatively high.5 In fact, the low degree of substitutability leads to market segmentation as
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Figure 5: Equilibrium market shares with ° = 0:05
In this case the number of consumers who can be additionally attracted by a decrease of
the subscription price is relatively low. The positive e®ects from ¯ercer competition for
customers are therefore small, with the consequence that ¯rms have an incentive to soften
competition by setting negotiated termination charges below marginal costs.
5Recall that we normalized variable costs of the ¯xed network to zero. Hence, negative values of prices
must not actually be negative. Otherwise, since negative values are implausible, the respective prices would
have to be set at the boundary of zero.
17Increasing ° (starting form ° = 0:05) implies higher substitutability and therefore lower
additional utilities from connecting to a mobile network. Ceteris paribus this reduces the
number of mobile customers, which also implies that the positive e®ects from increasing
their market shares become more important for the mobile companies (compare Figures 2
and 5). Consequently, the optimal a¤ is higher than marginal costs.6
However, an increase of ° from 0.5 to 0.75 and to 0.95 leads to a decrease of a¤. Here, the
high substitutability makes it hard to get any market share for mobiles at all (since everyone
already has a phone). Additionally, the genuine network e®ects of mobile phones are weak
if substitutability is high, since the added utility is marginal.
The welfare maximizing access charge aW is monotone decreasing in °. For low substi-
tutability one would like to induce stronger competition between mobile companies in order
to promote propagation of mobiles, which leads to higher realized network e®ects. For high
substitutability, mobile phones and network e®ects are of less importance and the socially
optimal access charge comes close to the marginal costs of termination. The di®erence be-
tween socially optimal and negotiated access charges, aW ¡a¤, is positive for low °, since the
¯rms have an incentive to soften competition. For high °, the di®erence becomes negative
which indicates that the ¯rms' motive to strengthen competition leads to market shares
which are ine±ciently high.
6 Summary
We analyze competition between two unregulated mobile phone companies with only partial
market coverage when there is already a regulated ¯xed network with full market coverage
in the background. Calls with a mobile and calls with the ¯xed telephone, to any given
person, are imperfect substitutes.
Mobile companies set the ¯xed{to{mobile access charges above the marginal cost of termi-
nation, in order to pro¯t from the calls originating at the ¯xed network and terminating
on their own network. The variable price components of tari®s are set above the perceived
marginal costs of termination. The ¯xed price components are used to gear the tradeo®
between attracting customers in competition (i.e. increase the mobile ¯rms' market share)
and extracting rents.
6A more detailed analysis reveals that a¤ exceeds marginal costs (c = 0) for ° ¸ 0:09.
18The most interesting result concerns the choice of the mobile{to{mobile access charges.
We assume that these charges are reciprocal and negotiated in bilateral bargaining. In a
symmetric equilibrium, the reciprocal access charge has no direct e®ect on ¯rms' pro¯ts.
However, ¯rms can use it as a strategic variable to a®ect their own behavior in the compe-
tition stage. From the standard model of competition between full{coverage ¯xed networks
with full price discrimination, it is well known that a higher access charge induces stronger
competition, due to the tari®{induced network e®ects. The same is true in our model.
However, in the standard model the implication is that ¯rms will set access charges below
marginal costs of termination, in order to soften competition. In our model the opposite is
true, in some numerical examples. Mobile companies have an incentive to induce stronger
competition, by setting the access charge above marginal costs of termination, with the
aim of increasing joint market coverage and thereby realizing network e®ects. The network
e®ects are due to the fact that the utility of a phone, including a mobile phone, is increasing
with the number of mobile owners. Thus, by raising the access charge, mobile companies use
the tari®{induced network e®ects instrumentally with the aim of realizing genuine network
e®ects.
This strategy is well in line with the aim of social welfare maximization and can hardly
be called `collusion'. In fact, the welfare maximizing level of access charges is also above
marginal costs of termination and may be higher or lower than the negotiated access charge.
We showed that the degree of substitutability has an important but non{monotonic e®ect on
the negotiated access charge. Starting from a low degree of substitutability, the negotiated
access charge is at ¯rst increasing in the degree of substitutability, probably because the
issue of gaining market coverage (and thus realized network e®ects) initially gets more
important when ¯xed and mobile phones become more substitutable. When substitutability
is already high, however, a further increase can lead to a decrease of the negotiated access
charge. This may be due to the fact that market coverage is then not an issue anyway and,
particularly, that the network e®ects are vanishing (mobiles become useless in the case of
perfect substitutability, since everyone already has a phone). Thus the e®ect described above
is particularly strong for the realistic case of an intermediate degree of substitutability.
In that case the model also generates a realistic structure of prices and access charges.
Concerning access charges, ¯xed{to{mobile exceed mobile{to{mobile, which in turn exceed
mobile{to{¯xed access charges. Concerning retail prices, ¯xed{to{mobile calls are more
19expensive than on{net mobile calls, which in turn are more expensive than mobile{to{¯xed
calls. Finally, o®{net mobile{to{mobile calls are more expensive than those on{net.
The model demonstrates that the standard full{coverage model of ¯xed network competition
is ill{applied for analyzing mobile network competition. For the latter it is important to
acknowledge partial market coverage, the existence of a full{coverage ¯xed network in the
background, imperfect substitutability between ¯xed and mobile calls, and the genuine
network e®ects that arise in such a setting.
Appendix
Starting with consumers' demand and using the Dixit utility function (5) we get the follow-
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The demand functions of the consumers connected to both the ¯xed network and mobile
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Using (16){(21) and analyzing the consumers' indirect utility functions vA;vB and vF it is



















This implies that the stability conditions for (10) and (11) are satis¯ed. Substituting (16){
(21) in the ¯rms' ¯rst order conditions for the optimal prices pi
i;pi
j;pi
F, equation (14), leads
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Turning to the optimal choices of si and pF
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In order to derive @nj=@si and @nj=@pF
i for i;j = A;B we can use (10) and (11) and the


































21Taking into account the relevant border conditions, i.e., ¹i R ¹¤ and µi R 0 with i = A;B,
and solving (30) and (31) we obtain @nj=@si and @nj=@pF
i . Finally, substituting (16){(24),
(27){(29) as well as @nj=@si and @nj=@pF









together with (10) and (11). Analyzing this system of equations shows that (10), (11) and
(32) are highly non{linear in si; pF
i and ni. In order to derive the solutions we ¯rst used
(10) and (11) to eliminate si. Relying on numerical calculations and assuming symmetry we
were then able to show that the two equations in (32) have a unique solution in nA = nB
and pF
A = pF
B which also leads to a maximum in the ¯rms' pro¯ts.
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